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Prejudicial In11uence on Jury of Newspaper Published
During Trial-People 'V. Purvis
Defendant had been paroled after serving four years of a sentence for second degree murder. While on parole, he was tried for
another homicide and convicted of murder in the first degree. In
separate penalty trials,1 juries had twice assessed the death sentence,
which, on both occasions, had been set aside by the reviewing court.
During the third trial, the Sunday newspaper in the local county
published a front-page article attacking the leniency of the parole
system, attributing the area's high crime rate partly to the recidivist tendencies of parolees, and quoting the county sheriff's opinion
that defendant should be sentenced to death. The following day
the prosecution began its closing argument and, over defense objections, made reference to the article. The jury adjourned for the
evening without receiving instructions to disregard the statements
in the newspaper and, the next day, returned a verdict imposing the
death penalty. On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, held,
reversed and remanded for a new trial, two judges dissenting. The
making of public statements concerning the pending trial by the

1. California and Pennsylvania provide for separate jury trials, after guilt has
been decided, to determine the punishment for fiISt degree murder. See CAL. PEN,
CODE § 190.1; PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp. 1961).
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sheriff, directing the attention of the jury to these statements by
the prosecution, and failure of the trial court to instruct the jury
to disregard the newspaper article constituted prejudicial misconduct and deprived defendant of a fair and impartial trial. People v.
Purois, 60 Cal. 2d 323, 384 P.2d 424 (1963).
In England, newspaper comment that may have a tendency to
prejudice a pending criminal trial can subject the newspaper to
proceedings for contempt of court.2 This has resulted in the practical
elimination of prejudicial, extraneous influences on the conduct of
trials in England.8 The American press, however, with essential
differences in traditions and history, 4 has not been so constrained.5
As a result, the rights of the accused to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, and to have unsworn and irrelevant testimony excluded
from the trial, may be jeopardized by newspaper publicity and commentary during trial. 6 In terms of the rights of individual defendants to a fair trial, the consequence has been what Mr. Justice Jackson has termed, in a notable concurring opinion in Shepherd v.
Florida, 7 "one of the worst menaces to American justice."8
There is little authority that holds prejudicial newspaper influence on a trial an unconstitutional denial of due process of law.9
2. Reviews of the English authorities are found in Holtzoff, The Relation Between
the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right of Freedom of the Press, l SYRACUSE L. REv.
369, 371.75 (1950), and in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 921-36
(1950).
3. Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARV. L. REv.
885, 909 (1935). The scope of this note encompassed the influence of other forms of
mass communication, in addition to newspapers, on jurors.
4. Hall, Reconciling Fair Trial and Free Press, 18 A.LA. LAw. 404, 406 (1957). But
see Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 285-88 (1941) (dissenting opinion).
5. Holtzoff, supra note 2, at 375.
6. Rifkind, When the Press Collides With Justice, 34 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 46, 49 (1950);
Stryker, Only Courts Should Try Cases, in Conference on Fair Trial-Free Press, II
N.Y. COUNTY LAw. Ass'N BAR BULL. 32 (1953). It is a fundamental rule of criminal law
that an accused is entitled to be tried solely on the basis of evidence offered in open
court. Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 638 (6th Cir. 1955). Absent this, the
result might be jury prejudice against defendant and destruction of the presumption
of innocence. 38 VA. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1952). See the examples of the Hiss and
Hauptmann trials in Bromley, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, Harper's, March 1951, p. 90.
The impact is likely to be worse if, as in the principal case, jurors receive the extraneous matter during the trial. Holtzoff, supra note 2, at 371. See principal case at
337, 384 P.2d at 430. This problem is somewhat reduced by the fact that defendants,
for whom trial by jury was established as a sacred right, are increasingly waiving jury
trial in favor of trial by judge. Perry, The Courts, the Press, and the Public, 30 MICH.
L. REv. 228, 232 (1931).
7. 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
8. Id. at 55.
9. Montgomery, The Treatment of Pending Litigation in the Press, 23 N.Y.S.B.A.
BULL. 314 (1951), citing Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (concurring opinion)
as the only authority. But cf. the following cases which were held violative of due
process: Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (discriminatory selection of jurors); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (failure to provide disinterested judge); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923) (bitterly hostile public opinion in the district of venue).
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In Irvin v. Dowd, 10 the United States Supreme Court did hold that,
because of the obviously prejudicial effect on jurors of pretrial publication of inflammatory matter, the accused was denied an impartial trial.11 This is a fairly narrow holding, however, affording
no protection to a defendant faced, not with a clearly inflammatory
publication, but rather with the publication of incompetent evidence that might influence the jury.12 Nevertheless, the reasoning of
the Court, based largely on the probable bias created in the minds of
the jurors, would seem to render the doctrine highly expandable.18
Trial court discretion in granting a new trial because of substantial prejudice from extraneous evidence, and appellate review
of convictions resulting from alleged misconduct or error are the
most usual methods of protecting the rights of an accused.14 However, resort to appelJate review is an expensive procedure.115 It is
10. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
11. Id. at 723-28. Defendant was accused of six murders and his trial had become
the cause ct!lebre of the small community of venue. The Supreme Court found that
"a barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed
against him during the six or seven months preceding his trial." Id. at 725. These
articles described defendant as a confessed slayer, a parole violator, and as remorseless
and without conscience. The Court found a pattern of deep and bitter prejudice to
be present throughout the community, as clearly reflected in the fact that almost
ninety per cent of the veniremen, including eight of the twelve jurors, entertained
some opinion as to defendant's guilt. See id. at 727.
12. Evidence regarding the deterrent nature of punishment may not be presented
to the jury in a first degree murder trial. People v. Love, 56 Cal. 2d 720, 731, 366
P .2d 33, 38 (1961). A sheriff's statements of facts predicated on his personal knowledge
is likewise inadmissible. Cf. People v. Lyons, 47 Cal. 2d 311, 318-19, 303 P.2d 329,
333-34 (1956). Both of these forms of incompetent evidence probably reached the jury
in ·the principal case through the newspaper article. See principal case at 339, 384
P.2d at 434.
13. Relying heavily upon Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), a federal district
court has recently taken tentative steps in this direction. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231
F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964). Defendant had been convicted for the murder of his
wife, but was released in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the court termed his
trial a "perfect example" of "trial by newspaper." Id. at 63. The murder and trial
had attracted widespread publicity, especially in Cleveland, where the court found
that "each of the three Cleveland newspapers repeatedly printed material which
strongly suggested and, in fact, urged petitioner's guilt." Id. at 57. Although only
fourteen of seventy-two veniremen stated that they had prejudged the guilt of defendant, the court found that defendant was denied due process of law because the
publicity during trial made it impossible to maintain impartiality of the jurors. The
publicity in the Sheppard case, supra, certainly was prejudicial to the defendant, and
much of it incompetent as evidence, but it does not seem to be of the inflammatory
nature of the articles in Irvin. Compare Irvin v. Dowd, supra, with Sheppard v.
Maxwell, supra.
14. Hays, Let Us Beware of Censorship, in Conference on Fair Trial-Free Press,
11 N.Y. COUNTY LAw. Ass'N BAR BuLL. 22, 23 (1953). Evidence received out of court
by the jury is grounds for a new trial. See ALI CODE OF CRIM. PROCEDURE § 365(b)
(1930); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1181(2). Change of venue and the civil action for libel are
other possible protective devices. But see Rifkind, supra note 6, at 51 (change of
venue a solution only in the days before modem communication).
15. A good example of this is the principal case, here sent back for the fourth time
for a full scale jury trial on the single issue of the penalty to be imposed. See principal
case at 353, 384 P .2d at 443.
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also unreliable in preventing miscarriages of justice because an
appellate court will disturb a conviction only in an extreme case.16
The almost fictional device of the customary admonition to the
jury to disregard certain matter will often satisfy an appellate court
that there was no prejudice.17 It may well be that criminal trials in
large metropolitan areas would be virtually impossible without this
device.18 It is clear, nevertheless, that as long as mass communication
media are permitted to publish matter pertaining to pending or
anticipated litigation, the individual's right to a fair and impartial
trial may be jeopardized.
The solution adopted in England, that of a broad contempt
power, 19 is barred in the United States on constitutional grounds.
In a series of three contempt cases20 involving publications which
could have influenced the trial judge's decision, 21 the Supreme
Court has refused to infringe upon freedom of press merely because
the commentary has a tendency to interfere with the judicial process.22 The small area presently left within the contempt power, as
limited by the Court's adopted standard of clear and present danger
to the administration of justice,23 is not yet clearly defined. Relying
on the circumstance that these Supreme Court cases have all dealt
with influences on a judge,24 Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested that
possibly a different standard would apply in the case of influence
on the judgment of a jury.215 This will probably prove, however, to
be merely one of the factors in the determination of a clear and
16. Note, !14 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1278, 1290 (1959). See, e.g., Himmelfarb v. United
States, 175 F.2d 924, 944 (1949) (incriminating and prejudicial error); People v. Hamil•
ton, 55 Cal. 2d 881, 900, 362 P.2d 473, 484 (1961) (reasonably possible that error tipped
the scales against defendant). But see King v. Commonwealth, 253 Ky. 775, 779, 70
S.W.2d 667, 669 (1934) (error had some effect on the verdict). The dissent in the
principal case felt that the standard was whether the error was in fact prejudicial.
See principal case at 354, 384 P.2d 444 (dissenting opinion).
17. See, e.g., Himmelfarb v. United States, supra note 16, at 950-51. This has been
called an "unmitigated fiction" in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453
(1949), and said to be no answer to the problem in Holtzoff, supra note 2, at 371.
The admonition to the jury reminded Judge Jerome Frank of the Mark Twain story
of the little boy ordered to stand in a comer and not think of a white elephant.
Hays, supra note 14, at 23.
18. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910): Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1278,
1291 (1959).
19. See note 2 supra.
20. Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 828 U.S. 381
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
21. See Craig v. Hamey, supra note 20, at 375; Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note
20, at 845; Bridges v. California, supra note 20, at 272.
22. See, e.g., Craig v. Hamey, supra note 20, at 876.
23. It has been suggested that almost no contempt conviction against a newspaper
would be constitutional. Montgomery, supra note 9, at 318. At any rate it seems that
all doubt will be resolved in favor of freedom of the press. Holtzoff, supra note 2,
at 377.
24. See cases cited note 21 supra.
25. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 838 U.S. 912, 921 (1950).
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present danger,26 the Court's sensitivity to censorship seemingly
eliminating the contempt power as an effective deterrent to news
media interference even with jurors.27
The conflict between the need for efficient judicial administration and the necessity of a fair trial, which is inherent in a system that
attempts to remedy prejudicial newspaper influence on jurors
through trial court discretion and appellate review, necessarily must
result. in a compromise of individual rights.28 A responsible press
that is sensitive to the protection of the right to a fair trial would,
of course, alleviate much of the problem.29 Similarly, the legal profession can do much to eliminate trial by newspaper. 30 The prosecution, whose primary duty is to see that justice is done, 31 is often
chargeable with collaboration in the publication of inflammatory
material or with exploiting it at the trial.32 Canon 20 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics generally condemns newspaper publication
by a lawyer concerning pending litigation,33 but the generality of,
26. See Doyle, Free Speech and Fair Trials, 22 NEB, L. REv. 1, 15 (1943); Rifkind,
supra note 6, at 50. This was the approach of the court in Baltimore Radio Show
v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
27. See Rifkind, supra note 6, at 47, 50.
28. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
29. Rifkind, supra note 6, at 51. There is, however, a great deal to be said for the
freedom from contempt afforded the American press. The press may correct other
outside influences, bring corruption to light, and in any event, is unlikely to influence
hardened judges. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28
CoLuM. L. REv. 525, 552 (1928). The forceful example of the Scottsboro case [Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)) is used to argue that the publicity of a trial is a
necessary protection. Hays, supra note 14, at 23. Moreover, in light of pressures for
high circulation, it has been suggested that no voluntary abstention from sensational
news would prove practical. Bromley, supra note 6, at 95.
30. One very practical remedy would seem to be discipline by the court of its
officers, including the prosecuting attorney and the police. Bromley, supra note 6,
at 95. There is at least one case where action has been taken against a police officer
for discussing with newspapers matters relating to a pending trial. See report of proceedings in Courts Haue Power To Defend Themselves From Harmful Publicity, 10
J. AM. Juo. Soc'Y 133, 138-47 (1927). It is unlikely that there is any case in which an
attorney has been held in contempt for similar actions. See 20 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
178, 179 (1963). There is some thought that the evil of trial by newspaper derives
from the fear of courts to take measures against the powerful newspapers. Perry, supra
note 6, at 233, 236. This thought led Mr. Justice Jackson to call for the judiciary to
demonstrate its fortitude. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 397 (1947).
31. Note, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 946, 947 (1954). Canon 5 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics reads in part: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is
not to convict, but to see that justice is done."
32. Perry, supra note 6, at 233; Wechsler, Conscience of Press vs. Conscience of Bar,
in Conference on Fair Trial-Free Press, 11 N.Y. COUNTY I.Aw. Ass'N BAR BuLL. 25,
26-27 (1953). Presumably the prosecuting attorney has more influence on the jury than
the defense attorney. Note, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 946, 947 (1954). A good illustration of
the use of prejudicial newspaper comment at a trial is provided by the principal case.
See principal case at 334-37, 384 P.2d at 431-33.
33, "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation
may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned."
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and consequent difficulty in enforcing, this canon have caused it
to be widely disregarded.34 Effective enforcement of even the most
specific canon, however, must depend upon the insistence of the
whole Bar on adherence to the standard embodied therein.85 It has
been suggested that watch-dog committees be established by the Bar
to deal with this single problem of enforcement.36 The legal profession, in conjunction with the press, has the task of protecting due
process of law from deterioration through trial by newspaper. The
task is hardly new or strange, but the evil is unlikely to be corrected
without leadership from, and discipline within, the legal profession.
34. See PHILLIPS &: McCOY, CoNDucr OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 161-67 (1952).
115. Id. at 179.
116. This suggestion was made by Judge Rifkind. Rifkind, supra note 6, at 51. The
enforcement by means of the present disbarment, suspension, and contempt proceedings is probably too lax and diverse from state to state. See PHILLIPS &: McCOY, op. cit.
supra note 114, at 85-129. This problem is, of course, not peculiar to the Canons involved with trial by newspaper.

